



# Fortinet Threat Report

Matteo Arrigoni

Senior System Engineer

[marrigoni@fortinet.com](mailto:marrigoni@fortinet.com)

# Agenda

Overview

2018 Trends Highlights

Q1 Report

# FortiGuard Labs Overview



**215**  
researchers  
& analysts



**480,000**  
research hours  
per year



**8** dedicated labs

- Sunnyvale
- Vancouver
- Ottawa
- France
- Singapore
- Taiwan
- Tokyo
- Kuala Lumpur

Presence in



**31**  
countries



**Research**



**Development**



**Innovation**



**Response**



**Outreach**





**Education**




**100 Billion**  
security events a day

# Threat Landscape Report 2018



We don't like surprise in this profession



ICS Q4 vs Q1.

CPU exploits 1 in 3,000 organizations  
Attacks targeting Apache 1 in 6 organizations.




# **Q1 Report**

# Threat Landscape Index

Is the Threat Landscape Getting Better or Worse?


- Q1 had more volatility than previous quarters – especially for malware
  - 40 malware families, made the weekly top 5 list over the quarter – when measured by volume per device
  - But the shift wasn't extraordinary
- Overall, the threat landscape index rose slightly over 1% in Q1



# Ransomware: Targeted & Tailored

Recent ransomware attacks exhibit a more designer and destructive nature

- Threat actors moving away from indiscriminate ransomware attacks to more targeted – more lucrative campaigns
- **LockerGoga**: disrupted operations at major **Norwegian aluminum manufacturer** – took weeks to remediate. Also targeted two American chemical companies, and a French engineering firm. Malware execution required administrative rights that would **have necessitated an attacker** to have already **gained some sort of privileged** access to the network, there was very little obfuscation. It's also curious that LockerGoga **appears to lock victims** out of their system.
- **Anatova**: pure 64-bit ransomware. Demands payment in **Dash cryptocurrency**. Avoids encrypting anything that impacts stability of system. The actors behind Anatova appear to have taken a cue from the operators of last year's prolific **GandCrab** in demanding ransom payments in Dash cryptocurrency instead of the usual bitcoins Avoids infecting computers being leveraged for malware analysis.
- Russia, Bulgaria, Italy recorded highest volume




Volume of LockerGoga, Anatova, and GandCrab by country in Q1 2019

**This is not typical opportunistic threat geographic distribution. The pattern here suggests targets of choice rather than targets of chance**

# Cryptocurrency Update

Coinhive – victim of its own success

- Coinhive - the Monero-based cryptomining service shut down in Q1
  - As expected – notable decline in detections of the 2 predominant Coinhive signatures
  - March 8<sup>th</sup> shutdown is evident for JS/Coinhive variant
  - Riskware/Coinhive signature likely due to lagging remediation of compromised servers
- JavaScript file could be installed on websites to generate income for the site owners
- The Monero transactions between parties were untraceable – which made it attractive to cybercriminals
- Revenue was reported to be \$250K a month




Decline in Coinhive detections during Q1 2019

# Shared Infrastructure

Why Buy & Build When You Can Borrow

- Botnets are leveraging established infrastructure
- 60% of threats shared at least one domain
- Rare to find sharing across kill-chain stages
  - Except: 6 key botnets share 9 domains between kill-chain stages




Infrastructure sharing among web filtering detections

# Compromised Traffic Timeline

## Exploratory Analysis: Web Filtering

- Web traffic blocks and logs attempted access to malicious, hacked or inappropriate websites
- We map type of website and phase of the kill chain where it occurs where it occurs
- Analysis:
  - Blue dots are weekdays | Orange dots weekends
  - Pre-compromise activity is roughly 3x more likely to occur during workweek
  - Post-compromise traffic shows less differentiation
  - Exploitation requires someone to click on something (phishing email, etc.), while C&C activity does not and can occur at any time



Comparison of web filtering volume for two Cyber Kill Chain phases during weekdays (blue) and weekends (orange).

**F**ORTINET®