

An Efficient and Privacy-Aware Method for Revealing Network Covert Channels

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Covert Channels

- Stegomalware uses information hiding to:
 - Elude well-known detection techniques
 - Orchestrate an attack
 - Exfiltrate sensitive data
 - ...
- Covert channels mainly exploit:
 - Host resources (CPU, memory usage, etc.)
 - Traffic (HTTP, DNS, etc.)
- Challenges:
 - Unknown a priori
 - Threat-dependent
 - Scalability
 - Privacy




Figure 1. Local covert channel.




Figure 2. Network covert channel.

extended Berkeley Packet Filter


 eBPF leverages codeaugmentation features of the Linux kernel.

Programs are executed when the kernel hits certain hook points.

Privacy-aware.

Easily extensible.

Memory bounded.




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Data Collection for Network Covert Channels

 Organization of the eBPF map: the whole range of values of a field is split into B equallyspaced bins. Each bin has a corresponding counter.

Goals:

- It guarantees privacy
- It can be adapted to many protocols
- Larger fields can be mapped into a smaller space



Metrics and Detection

- Reveal of covert channels, by producing:
 - "new" metrics
 - a "pictorial" status of the network traffic (e.g., heatmaps)
- Example detection IPv6 use case:
 - Comparison between an estimate of active IPv6 flows and third-party measurements
 - Temporal evolution of heatmaps




Figure 5. eBPF measurement example.




Figure 6. Temporal evolution of the bins.

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Conclusions

- Covert channels can target both host resources and network packets.
- eBPF guarantees the visibility on the entire host.
- Our framework ensures:
 - Privacy-awareness
 - Efficiency
 - Extensibility and scalability
- Current research goals:
 - Comparison with other security tools
 - Use of the eBPF framework to deal with other threats