

Integrazione della QKD nelle fibre ottiche per le telecomunicazioni

Alice Meda



INRiM

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Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy

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
Quantum computing promises transformative simulation and modelling capabilities across a diverse range of industries. However, these advances in computational power will also introduce significant risks via the potential threat of disruption to some widely used encryption standards. While definitive timelines for both quantum computing applications and the associated quantum cybersecurity threats have not yet fully materialized, organizations must act now to evaluate their readiness to adapt to the quantum threat.



What is Quantum Key Distribution?


Cryptography is the art of rendering a message unintelligible to any unauthorized party

An algorithm -a **Cipher**- combines the message with some additional information -the **Key**- producing a cyphertext. The system is **secure** if the cyphertext can be unlocked only by the Key



Quantum Cryptography (QKD) is able to distributed unconditionally secure Keys by means of single quantum systems

QM does **not prevent** eavesdropping, it only allows the **detection** of the presence of an **eavesdropper**, as this presence induces **differences** in the generated Keys. **Unconditional secure Keys** are established once **Alice and Bob** constantly monitor the security of the quantum communication channel




Alice's random bit	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
Alice's random sending basis	+	+	×	+	×	×	×	+
Photon polarization Alice sends	↑	→	↘	↑	↘	↗	↗	→
Bob's random measuring basis	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+
Photon polarization Bob measures	↑	↗	↘	↗	→	↗	→	→
PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF BASIS								
Shared secret key	0		1			0		1

European Quantum Communication Infrastructure

DECLARATION ON A QUANTUM COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE EU

All 27 EU Member States have signed a declaration agreeing to work together to explore how to build a quantum communication infrastructure (QCI) across Europe, boosting European capabilities in quantum technologies, cybersecurity and industrial competitiveness.



EuroQCI: European Commission initiative, working with all 27 EU Member States and the European Space Agency (ESA), to design, develop and deploy a quantum communication infrastructure

EuroQCI space segment

Distribution of quantum-secured encryption keys on a global scale



EuroQCI terrestrial segment

Federation of national terrestrial QCI networks with cross borders connections



QUID: Quantum Italy Deployment


2023-2025



➤ Deploy advanced national quantum systems and networks for testing quantum communication technologies and for integrating them with existing communication networks

➤ Use these quantum systems and networks for developing and testing use cases

➤ Quantum Metropolitan Area Networks (QMAN), >14 points in 9 towns: Turin, Milan, Bologna, Padua, Trieste, Florence, Rome, Naples, Matera.



Italian Quantum Backbone


- 1800 km of dedicated optical fiber
- QUID: Long range QKD / 7 Q-MAN / 9 Use Case / 18 partners
- 6 nodes for ultrastable laser delivery
- Precise **time and frequency** references at all points of presence across Italy (VLBI Geodesy, Aerospace-Galileo)
- A testbed for **quantum physics** experiments and **distributed fiber sensing**
- WR-PTP for several public/private sub-ns time distribution
- Two fibers: one with data, one dark



Real world QKD

The actual implementations of the QKD protocols belong to a number of broad technological realization classes: DV, CV, entanglement based, DI, MDI, Twin-Field.


Point-to-point (P2P) DV QKD and **Twin-Field QKD** are, to date, the most documented protocols by standardization bodies.



Two units physically separated at opposite ends of **a pair of communication channels, a quantum and a service channel.**

In the classical channel optical signals for clock synchronization/recovery and distillation of data are transmitted.

Single photon detectors



ID210 Free-running NFAD



ID220 Gated and Free-running Module





ID230 Ultra-Low noise NFAD



ID281 SNSPD

Real-World channel requirements




Open Access | Published: 26 April 2017

Fundamental limits of repeaterless quantum communications

Stefano Pirandola, Riccardo Laurenza, Carlo Ottaviani & Leonardo Banchi

Nature Communications 8, Article number: 15043 (2017) | Cite this article

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


Adapted from M. Pitaluga et al
Nat. Photon. 13, 334 (2019)

OPTICAL AMPLIFIERS




QUANTUM REPEATERS




Credit: Alan Stonebraker


TRUSTED NODES



No Cloning Theorem




QUANTUM REPEATERS




Credit: Alan Stonebraker

TRUSTED NODES




No Cloning Theorem



Not applicable (yet)



TRUSTED NODES



Long-Haul Transmission




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
TRUSTED NODE SOLUTION



ROMA – RIETI
1550 nm
LOSSES: 25 dB
BG ~ 1700 cps




RIETI – L' AQUILA
1310 nm
LOSSES: 25 dB
BG ~ 6000 cps



L' AQUILA – FUCINO
1550 nm
LOSSES: 27 dB
BG ~ 1000 cps



Twin-Field QKD Setup



C. Clivati, A. Medaet *et al.*, Nat. Commun. **13**, 157 (2022)

G. Bertaina *et al.*, Adv. Quantum Technol. **7**, 2400032 (2024)

Grazie per l'attenzione!

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